자치단체 통합의 이해: 정치모형의 적용

초록

This paper analyses local government consolidation efforts in Korea with a political model of consolidation as its analytic framework. The political model of consolidation posits that consolidation is not a result of rational decision making to resolve social problems. Rather, it is closer to a political game to procure selective gains by proponents of consolidation. Accordingly, to understand consolidation adequately, a political analysis of “who gets what, how and when” is required. Summarizing the conclusions of this thesis: the leading proponents of local government consolidation in Korea are the elected members of the National Assembly, especially since the launch of local-autonomy institutions. Their primary motive in promoting consolidation has been to weaken and root out the elected mayors from the political stage. In Korea, the mayors tend to be regarded by the members of the National Assembly as their political rivals, competing on the same political turf for supremacy in local areas. Consolidation provides the members with an efficient path to incapacitate or eliminate their political rivals. Since consolidations in Korea are driven by such a political motive it is highly expected that a political model will predict that the proclaimed and promised goals of consolidation, such as efficiency and local competitiveness, are unmet. This expectation is supported by many empirical analyses to examine the effects of consolidation and reach the negative conclusion of “no significant effects” over the 30 local governments consolidated in 1999, just before the institutionalization of local autonomy.

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