‘집단표시에 의한 모욕죄’와 혐오표현

초록

This study examines the criteria by which our courts judge ‘The contempt by group defamation’, and examines the logic of the rulings that admit the contempt. As a result of the analysis, the precedents who denied ‘The contempt by group defamation’ saw the number of members in the group as the main criterion. However, lower court rulings that admitted insults included the defendant"s expression on the individual"s social assessment, the content and intent of the expression, the meaning of the context, the nature and social status of the victim group, the professional characteristics of the victim group, and the social status of the speaker. The way of speech was comprehensively considered. In addition, the Supreme Court ruling, cited by ‘The contempt by group defamation’, is a precedent that dealt with a reported case as if all members did something wrong, regardless of the nature of the group. Therefore, the ‘personality of the group’ considered in this reference case is very different from that of forming a group that distinguishes it from others by participating in collective communication, such as the victims of the Jeju 4.3 event or the Gwangju Democratization Movement. This point is not to be overlooked when it comes to judging ‘The contempt by group defamation’. Considering the association between the group"s distinctive sign and insulting expression, and actively introducing the comprehensive judgment factors of subordinates, it is judged that legal regulation of aversion to a specific group may be more widely available than at present.

키워드