공정거래법상 부당한 공동행위 사건의 과징금 감경률 결정요인에 대한 연구

초록

This article studies how the penalty surcharge rates are set for the participants of illegal collusions in Korea. It investigates whether the rates are set in accordance with the rules explicitly stipulated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. The results show that these rules are not strictly implemented and that arbitrary adjustments are made in many cases. For example, significantly more reduction is granted when the potential surcharge amount of a case is large relative to the market sizes. On the other hand, the net benefit for the applicants of leniency program is not on average as big as it is generally regarded, especially for the applicants who are not the first one to cooperate. This is because non-applicants also tend to be granted reduction of surcharges for various reasons.

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