무의견(無意見)의 인식적 가치와 극단적인 허용주의

초록

An agent can have a nihilistic opinion on some proposition. That is, an agent have no credence in some propositions. And (i) propositions in which different agents have no credence can be different. Epistemic decision theory attempts to reveal the nature of rational doxastic states by appealing to the epistemic value of doxastic states. It is noteworthy that standard epistemic decision theory assumes that (ii) the epistemic value of having the nihilistic opinion is the same as the epistemic value of having a certain credence. The aim of this paper is to show that, given (i) and (ii), in any evidential situation, it follows from the assumption that there is at least one rational doxastic state that there are more than one rational doxastic states.

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