펀드 판매의 문제점과 개선 대책

초록

Various financial disputes arise in various nations including those between Goldman Sachs and its investors in the USA in 2010 and those between commercial or savings banks and their customers in Korea as in the Insight Fund incident in 2009 or misselling of subordinated bonds to bank customers in 2011. This paper works on how to ex ante prevent and ex post resolve financial disputes due to misselling of funds in particular, as funds are getting more and more important risky assets for most individual investors, who are more likely to be exposed to financial feuds than are corporate investors. We find that the nature of most financial disputes from miselling of funds lies in information asymmetry, conflict of interest, and asymmetric burden of proof between financial consumers and sellers of funds. As long-term, fundamental ways to prevent and resolve such disputes, this paper suggests advising financial consumers by experts, independent advising, establishment of financial infrastructure for such advising, and fair assignment of burden of proof. Specifically, we first explain about independent financial advisers of the UK and their socio-economic implications for Korea. Secondly, we investigate Investment Adviser Public Disclosure (IAPD) and Charles Schwab Institutional of the USA in depth as examples of efficient financial infrastructure. Lastly we introduce opt-out policies as an effective way out of miselling of funds.

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