임원의 보수 결정 과정에 대한 실증 분석: 미국과 한국의 비교

초록

This paper analyzes decision making process and determinants of executive compensation in U.S. firms with qualitative and quantitative methodologies in order to compare those of Korean firms. In Korea, the compensation level of individual executive is not released until 2013. However, the amendment of capital market law in 2013 requested firms to publish individual level of executive compensation and estimation method for those who receive higher than 500 million won in corporate annual report. We found that the relationship between firm performance and compensation is different between two countries. In U.S., higher firm performance leads to the higher compensation, while executives are paid regardless of firm performance in Korea. Second, firms with more independent board pay higher wages in U.S., however, there is no relationship between board independence (independent director ratio) and executive wages in Korea. Our empirical analysis provides benchmark to korean firms about the determinants of executive compensation. Moreover, our paper suggest that korean firms need to adopt corporate governance measurements such as performance based pay package or say-on-pay vote to protect shareholder right and to improve corporate governance.

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