합작투자와 파트너 매칭(Matching)의 내재적 위험과 기회비용적 접근: 선의(善意) vs. 악의(惡意)?

초록

Joint venture is considered to be one of key strategic behaviors based on the mutual capital investments of partner firms; however, approximately the half of JVs are terminated within five to six years. A handful of previous works attempted to explain why such casual dissolutions occur relying on a real option approach saying that original firms have real options to terminate JVs once the gains out of JV outweighs its costs. In contrast to this, we scrutinize a case where both an original firm and its partner are direct competitions with complementary assets. It is obvious that mismatching can occur at any time. Alternatively speaking, an original firm is generically exposed to a risk being matched with a non-able partner, which can deteriorate the synergy effect out of the JV. Thus, the original firm is required to make a strategic decision based on productivity rather than simply relying on such a luck that both firms can generate synergy effects. Actually, evaluating productivity is an effective way to secure JV’s longevity; if the original firm assures that its partner firm is not an appropriate partner for the JV, the, it can terminate the JV in order to compensate for the opportunity costs associated with the JV. This implicates that monitoring effort are required to sustain successful JV. In addition to this, original firm must threaten potential JV counterparts in a way that mutual collaboration will be terminated quickly if they turned out to be inappropriate partners.

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