비트겐슈타인과 비엔나 모임: 과학철학적 접점

초록

I claim that the conventional understanding of Wittgenstein's view on the relation between science and philosophy and of the interactions between Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle scholars is problematic in several aspects based on recent scholarship on Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle. While Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle were unanimously opposed to the traditional form of metaphysics as ‘the first philosophy’ not constrained by empirical findings about the world, they were not against all forms of metaphysics, especially empirical or scientific metaphysics which can be firmly rooted on our scientific understanding of the world. I also claim that Wittgenstein maintained a version of physicalism which can be interpreted as foundationalistic, only Schlick among Vienna Circle scholars argued for foundationalistic physicalism without ambiguity. This fact is understandable given that no one in the Circle including Schlick, Carnap, Neurath regarded scientific knowledge to be in need of philosophical justifications.

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