지속 가능한 시장 선점자 우위와 경쟁의 역할

초록

This paper simulates the long-term expansion and survival of rapidly growing but recently established niche marketing startups A discrete choice single prize innovation race is applied to simulate their investment and M&A behavior. We particularly consider a signaling game toward niche markets. Two potential entrants, say early competitors, working in their original markets send a signal either 'enter' or 'not enter'. When they send a signal 'not enter', then consumers in niche markets would value more highly on the quality of niche marketers. If a signal 'enter' arrives, then the market perceived quality of niche marketers would deteriorate. Using the 'high' or 'low' value of the two types of signals and market shocks, we construct four business scenarios. According to simulation results, niche marketers would be more likely to maintain its market leadership when their niche markets are expected to be more competitive. If a high market shock occurs, niche marketers become to have less incentives to invest, which dissipates their first mover advantages. Concerning on M&A, niche marketers never sell their innovations. In contrast, early competitors would sell a racing innovation to niche marketers when they send a 'enter' signal along with a low market shock.

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