독일연방헌법재판소의 PSPP결정 ― 유럽중앙은행 역할과 기능의 변화 및 그 한계를 중심으로 ―

초록

For the first time, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) declared its competences, namely monetary policy measures by the European Central Bank (ECB), to be ultra vires through the so-called PSPP judgment of May 5th, 2020, legal actions of Union bodies, i.e. exceeding the competences under Union law and thus not only Union law but also unconstitutional, i.e. breaking German constitutional law. The ruling on the constitutional complaints related indirectly to the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP). The PSPP is a sub-program for purchasing public sector bonds within the Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP). The overstepping of powers is that the ECB neither examines nor explains whether the PSPP complies with the principle of proportionality, because the monetary policy measures have an impact on economic and fiscal policies, the competences of which lie in the member states. Before that, the BVerfG submitted the ECB decision to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to examine conformity with Union law. In its preliminary ruling (Weiss judgment), the CJEU considered the PSPP of the ECB to be covered by EU competences. However, the BVerfG does not see itself bound by this, because the Weiss judgment of the CJEU in turn acted ultra vires. From the point of view of the BVerfG, the Weiss judgment of the CJEU is “absolutely no longer comprehensible” and “methodologically no longer justifiable” because the CJEU failed to take account of the principle of proportionality between the monetary policy objective and the economic impact through an overall evaluation weight and weigh. With an clear arbitrary interpretation of the treaties, the CJEU has left its mandate. The German Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and the German Federal Government are therefore obliged to work towards the ECB's proportionality test and to make their legal opinion clear. Although the BVerfG had found the decision of the CJEU and the PSPP of the ECB to be ultra vires due to their insufficient proportionality test, the principle of proportionality is a rule on the exercise of powers, not a rule on the demarcation of powers. The ECB or the CJEU is also better suited than the BVerfG to decide which policy the means in question actually belong to. Therefore, the BVerfG should apply the so-called ultra vires review for European integration cautiously, exceptionally and in a Europe-friendly manner. Despite the unconvincing justification of the PSPP ruling, it is significant and has lasting effects as it is the first time the BVerfG has set limits for the EU organs, especially for the role and function of the ECB.

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