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초록

Previous literature on inside trading has examined the abnormal returns of the insiders' trades. But this paper analyzes insiders' behavior on trading before earnings announcement and its disclosure activities. This paper provides evidence that insiders not only utilize the information asymmetry, particularly discrepancies of forthcoming earnings announcements and market expectations, but also opportunistically select trade disclosure date. An analysis of insiders' trading patterns by their position shows that the opportunistic behavior is more predominant among the managing executives than outside block shareholders. Insiders' selling activity is greater prior to the announcement of lower-than-expected earnings. Furthermore, their sell-trades reporting is delayed longer than buy-trades. Managers of the firms with analysts' earnings coverage, however, generally show lower level of opportunistic behavior than those of firms with no analyst following. Our findings generally support the view of insiders' opportunistic behavior, and provide implications for the more stringent enforcement of insider trading regulations.

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