중앙아시아와 일대일로: 중국식 개발모델의 한계

초록

We will examine the responses and policies of Central Asian countries against China's BRI. Central Asian countries are responding differently depending on their own resources and finances, but they think BRI as an opportunity and a threat at the same time. China has become the largest trading partner of Central Asiann countries since the global financial crisis in 2008. China mainly exports its manufacturing products and Central Asian countries mainly export their energy resources. An important reason why China is interested in Central Asia is due to its enormous reserves of energy resources. China imports energy resources in Central Asia, and on the other hand, Central Asia is considered as an important market. China has established the ‘Silkroad Fund’ in 2014 with a capital of 61.525 billion Yuan to promote BRI routes to Central Asia and constructed the ‘New Eurasian Land Bridge’(International Railway), ‘Asia-West Asia’(oil and gas pipeline) energy corridor is under construction. However, Kazakhstani people rallied against China, the largest investor to the country, for anti-Chinese protests in 2016. Financially rich Turkmenistan is almost indifferent about BRI, while poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are actively welcoming the initiative. Uzbekistan, which is not bordering with China, does not reject BRI as long as it is helpful to the Uzbekistan’s economy. However, Central Asian countries are becoming more and more negative on BRI. In particular, the Chinese development model eventually benefits only for Chinese companies, the local residents are still unemployed, the main resources are plundered, and the national debt is getting bigger and bigger. Historically, Central Asian countries viewed China as a factor of external insecurity not less than Russia. The confrontation between the Chinese empire and the nomadic tribes in Central Asia has been disappeared a long time ago, but on the other hand, China is appearing both as an opportunities and a threats.

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