코로나위기와 국가재정의 헌법적 문제 – 코로나위기 대응을 위한 국가부채 증대에 대한 독일 논의를 중심으로 –

초록

In 2009, the so-called “Schuldenbremse”(debt brake) was introduced into Grundgesetz(the Basic Law) as part of Federalism Reform II. As the core of the new constitutional regulation, Art. 109 III, Art. 115 II GG states that the budgets of the state (federal and state) are to be balanced in principle without new debt. The federal government is allowed a net borrowing of 0.35% in relation to GDP and exceeding the standard ceilings in cases of natural disasters and extraordinary emergencies that are beyond the control of the state and significantly affect the state's financial status. The government debt volume, which has been reduced for 10 years since then, shows that the debt brake is working well for the strong financial situation in Germany. Because of the Corona crisis, the Bundestag had passed two supplementary budgets, so that the federal government took on a total of 217.8 billion euros in new debt in 2020. The total federal debt thus increases from less than 60% to more than 75% of GDP. This debt exception has proven that the exception for the debt brake is capable of acting and elastically reactive in the pandemic. In terms of constitutional law, Art. 115 GG sets the limits on the new debt in the crisis. Formally, Art. 115 (2) sentence 6 GG requires a parliamentary decision by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, which, according to Art. 115 (2) sentence 7 GG, is to be combined with a repayment plan. In material terms, the scope of the new debt must be suitable to ward off the emergency situation, to remedy it or to alleviate its consequences. Although there is no direct link to overcoming or averting crises, debt may be legitimate if the majority of Parliament has decided it is permissible. Of course, the parliamentary decision must not appear obviously arbitrary or justifiable. With this interpretation, the debt brake will not only be sustainable in normal, but also in an emergency (or new normal).

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