The impact of political capabilities and political markets on firms' decision to lobby

초록

This paper investigates how firms' political capabilities and countries' political structures affect firms' lobbying decision. We use a cross-country, firm-level dataset that covers more than 22,013 firms in 46 countries to discover that a firm's individual- and collective-level political capabilities are positively associated with lobbying. In contrast, the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats in a country's political market is negatively associated with the firm's possibility of lobbying. Finally, we also find that the positive role of a firm's political capabilities in lobbying is mitigated by the degree of checks and balances among bureaucrats. This study contributes to the literature of corporate political activities by filling the research gaps (1) as considering both horizontal and vertical checks and balances among bureaucrats in political markets, and (2) as simultaneously considering firms' individual and collective political capabilities, by taking one more conceptual step on the literature of contingent dynamic capabilities and lobbying.

키워드