내/외부 감시비용과 경영자와 감사인간 의견불일치

초록

Financial statements prepared by management may be distorted by various motivations of management. To curb the manager’s opportunistic behavior, companies spend money on internal and external monitoring. If internal monitoring is efficient enough, the quality of the financial statements prepared by the management will be high and the level of a revision made by the auditor will be low. In other words, auditor-client disagreement will decrease. In addition, if external monitoring is efficient enough, it is likely that the auditor will discover and correct any distortions contained in the financial statements prepared by the management. Therefore, the extent to which the auditor revises will increase. We find that the internal monitoring cost measured by the compensation of outside directors, audit committee or internal auditors is negatively associated with the auditor-client disagreement. However, we find that the external monitoring cost measured by external audit fees is positively associated with the auditor-client disagreement. These results can be interpreted that as the higher the monitoring costs, the more efficient monitoring are, thus suppressing the opportunistic behavior of managers. Existing previous studies tested the effect of the human resources in internal control, the introduction of the audit committee on the auditor-client disagreement. However, this study tests the effect of the compensations of outside directors, the audit committee or internal auditors that company is actually bearing, on the auditor-client disagreement. Furthermore, this study differs from previous studies in that it investigates the relationship between the internal/external monitoring costs and the auditor-client disagreement.

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