실업보험급여의 적정 구조에 대한 연구 : 일반균형모형을 이용한 접근

초록

We attempt to identify the optimal structure of replacement ratio of unemploy- ment insurance(UI) benefit, using a general equilibrium model, which reflects the characteristics of macroeconomic variables, employment stability, UI, and other social welfare policies such as Minimum Living Standards Security System(MLSS), and Earned Income Tax Credit(EITC). We found that under a hypothetical situation with no moral hazards of workers, the optimal replacement ratio of UI benefit is 100%. However, reflecting the decree of moral hazard observed in the data of UI benefit recipients, the optimal replacement ratio falls to 60%. Moreover, taking into explicit account the existence of the MLSS and the EITC, there is little welfare gain of unemployment insurance, except for the high-income class, because the income risks of low-income classes from unemployment were already pooled by the MLSS. It is also found that the limiting benefits improves the social welfare by limiting level of unemployment insurance contribution rate, which decreases the excess burden from the unemployment system. The optimal level of the upper bound for the UI benefit is shown about 80% of average wage income. Finally, the provision of UI benefit increases the variability of employment rates of old age groups more than for the younger age groups, which implies that the replacement ratio should be lower for older age groups.

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