배당 스무딩 행태의 결정 요인

Determinants of Dividend Smoothing in Korea

초록

This research analyzes the phenomenon of “short-lived delisting”, which refers to the fact that some IPO firms end up with forced delisting after short listing period. We have found that firms with bigger size, lower debt ratio, longer history of business, and higher inside ownership are less likely to result in short-lived delisting. This result implies that the possibility of short-lived delisting is negatively correlated with the degree of sufficiency for listing requirements. Secondly, we could not find strong evidence supporting for certification role of IPO mechanisms. Underwriters’ reputation does not significantly correlated with short-lived delisting. We could not find any evidence that short-lived delisted firms pay higher underwriters’ fee. Thirdly, firms raising more capital through IPO are less likely to result in short-lived delisting. However the usage of funded capital is not related with the possibility of short-lived delisting. This result contradicts with the notion that firms undertaking IPO for long-term investment, such as PPE investment or R&D investment, would be more likely to successfully stay in listing status.

키워드

Dividend SmoothingAsymmetric InformationAgency CostFinancial ConstraintsHeckman 2 Stage Model배당 스무딩정보 비대칭대리인 비용재무적 제약Heckman 2단계 모형
제목
배당 스무딩 행태의 결정 요인
제목 (타언어)
Determinants of Dividend Smoothing in Korea
저자
한민연강형구
발행일
2015-09
저널명
대한경영학회지
28
9
페이지
2407 ~ 2438