자진신고자 감면제도의 효과와 그 결정요인들

초록

Using cartel investigation and leniency program records in Korea, we test the predictions of game theory on prisoners’ dilemma that the size of immediate payoff from confession vis-a-vis the expected profit from future collusion determines the incentive to confess. We test this theory against 130 cartel cases in Korea in the period of 2005 to 2009. We use probit regressions to find the determinants of the probability of leniency application. The results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions: cartel members are more likely to confess when the applicable surcharge is larger; when they are in a bidding market rather than in a continuously operating market; when the cartel has already seen some withdrawals; and when the economy is in a recession. However, some results are contrary to the theoretical prediction: members of large business groups, the Chaebols, have higher tendency to apply for leniency. We also find evidence partially consistent with the hypothesis that leniency application affects the strength of the antitrust authority’s enforcement against the cartel: the base surcharge rate is higher in leniency cases than in others.

키워드