기업집단 지배구조의 특성이 계열회사의 정보비대칭과 주가동조화에 미치는 영향

초록

The objective of this paper is to find how the features of corporate governance affect the information environment of subsidiaries. One of the most interesting characteristics of conglomerates is its increasing complexity of corporate governance structure. As a result, transferring information content of one subsidiary to another subsidiary is more prevalent than in the past. Corporate governance, especially, shareholding structure in a conglomerate relates information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. That is, when the relative portion of shareholding in a conglomerate is high, information asymmetry increases because it is likely to be difficult for outside stakeholders (including potential stakeholders) to access firm-specific information of a particular subsidiary. In the meantime, market participants tend to exploit relatively easy-to-use information such as industry, capital market, and macro-economy data rather than hard-to-use firm-specific data when they make investment decisions. Thus complex shareholding structure of conglomerate comes out to increase both information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity simultaneously.

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