플랫폼 시대 한국 영상물 IP 배분과 동태적 효율성: 코즈 정리 관점의 분석

초록

This study examines how the initial allocation of intellectual property (IP) rights in global OTT platform-centered contracting structures affects the dynamic efficiency of the Korean audiovisual industry. Here, industrial efficiency is not understood in a static sense, but is instead defined as dynamic efficiency, operationalized in terms of creators' expected income, the possibility of recovering follow-up IP revenues, producers' asset accumulation, and the capacity to reinvest in subsequent projects. Methodologically, the study adopts a conceptual and comparative case-study approach, comparing three institutional arrangements: the AVMS-based regulatory model in France, the collective management model in the Korean music industry, and OTT-centered rights-concentrated contracting structures in the Korean audiovisual market. The analysis suggests that in platform environments characterized by high transaction costs and asymmetric bargaining power, the initial allocation of IP rights is not easily corrected through ex post negotiation. It further indicates that institutional arrangements featuring rights reversion, collective bargaining structures, and open channels for downstream revenue recovery tend to provide relatively more favorable conditions for creator incentives and producers' asset accumulation. Rather than directly testing the Coase theorem, this study uses it as an analytical benchmark to identify the conditions under which Coasean bargaining fails in platform environments and to examine the institutional devices that may mitigate such failure. On this basis, the study discusses several policy implications for the Korean audiovisual industry.

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